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Seven PrinciPleS for equitable adaPtation1
Prof. Alice Kaswan*
As Professors Robert Bullard and Beverly Wright have stated,“[c]limate change looms as the global environ-mental justice issue of the twenty-first century,” posing 
critical challenges “for communities that are already overbur-
dened with air pollution, poverty, and environmentally related 
illnesses.”2 Around the world, sea level rise, more extreme 
storms, heat waves, wildfires, changing weather patterns, and 
the spread of disease appear inevitable.3 Reducing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions is necessary but not sufficient to address 
the potential damage.4 Global, national, and subnational adapta-
tion measures to reduce climate harm are essential.5 To avoid 
substantial disparities in the 
impacts of climate change, 
equity considerations should 
play a vital role in emerging 
United States adaptation initia-
tives.6 Focusing on domestic 
law, this article briefly describes 
climate change impacts and the 
role of socioeconomic factors 
in determining their magnitude. 
It then provides seven prin-




Among the most dramatic 
impacts of climate change will 
be the increasing incidence 
of disasters.7 Climate scientists anticipate that flooding will 
become more common and severe as sea levels rise and hurri-
canes become more intense, generating more destructive storm 
surges – the consequences of which were all too evident after 
Hurricane Sandy’s inundation of New York and New Jersey in 
Fall 2012.8 Throughout the nation, precipitation events are likely 
to become more extreme9 and, in some parts of the country, 
overall precipitation levels are already increasing dramatically.10 
Scientists predict increasing wildfires in the western states,11 
predictions borne out by recent record-breaking fires.12 Risks 
from flooding and fire include not only the direct harm from ris-
ing waters or flames, but contamination risks from inundated or 
incinerated industrial and hazardous waste facilities,13 the need 
to dispose of tons of debris,14 and the long-term housing and 
economic impacts that endure for years after major disasters.15 
Adaptation measures must address adequate disaster prepared-
ness, response, recovery, and mitigation measures to reduce 
long-term risks.
Increasing disaster risks could also render certain parts 
of the country uninhabitable. Migration away from low-lying 
coastal areas and floodplains may ultimately be necessary.16 
Certain tribal communities in coastal Alaska, like the Village 
of Kivalina, already face the need to relocate.17 Additional cli-
mate impacts, like unsustainably high temperatures, droughts or 
saltwater intrusion that depletes essential water supplies, could 
likewise require large-scale population shifts.18 Adaptation 
measures must address local decision-making processes that 
govern decisions about when to protect an area from harm 
(through, for example, coastal armoring, levees, or the enhance-
ment of natural buffers), when 
to adjust (through, for example, 
building standards to increase 
resilience), and when to retreat 
(through, for example, con-
servation easements or public 
purchase of at-risk property).
Scientists have also found 
that climate change will lead 
to numerous public health 
threats. Climate scientists 
predict that by 2100, average 
temperatures in the United 
States will increase by four to 
eleven degrees and heat waves 
that historically occurred once 
every twenty years will occur 
every other year.19 Heat waves 
are among the most lethal of 
disasters, causing as many or more deaths than other types of 
disasters.20 Moreover, higher temperatures trigger higher pollu-
tion levels, increasing the negative public health consequences 
of high heat.21 Warmer temperatures in the United States are 
also predicted to lead to the spread of disease and allergens.22
Climate change will have pervasive economic impacts 
as well. For example, 80,000 businesses and almost 400,000 
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disaster preparedness, 
response, recovery, and 
mitigation measures to 
reduce long-term risks.
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jobs were reportedly lost from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.23 
Changes in resource availability, like water supplies, could 
increase the cost of water and, given the importance of irrigation 
to agriculture, increase the cost of food.24 Warmer temperatures 
may increase demand for air conditioning, potentially increasing 
electricity costs.25 Climate mitigation efforts, however well-
meaning, could also increase energy costs, by either placing a 
price on carbon through a market-based control mechanism or 
by encouraging the use of more expensive renewable energy 
sources.26 More broadly, adaptation measures themselves are 
likely to be extremely costly. Fortifying or moving key infra-
structure, like roads, airports, and sewage treatment plants, will 
cost billions.27 Relocating communities or buying out property 
owners to protect them from harm would cost billions more.28 
Disaster response and reconstruction costs multiple billions of 
dollars.29 Indirectly, addressing 
climate impacts and financing 
adaptation measures could drain 
government resources from other 
functions, like education and the 
social safety net, unless alternative 
financing sources are developed.30
Climate Change impaCts 
and equity
The consequences of cli-
mate change will be experienced 
unevenly. In the United States, 
poor and marginalized communi-
ties without sufficient financial 
and social resources will face 
signif icant adaptation chal-
lenges.31 To quote Professor Robert Verchick: “Catastrophe 
is bad for everyone. But it is especially bad for the weak and 
disenfranchised.”32
While it is critical to determine risk exposure – to assess 
the likelihood that a community will encounter a given climate 
impact – a community’s ultimate vulnerability cannot be deter-
mined without also assessing its sensitivity and its capacity to 
cope. 33 Depending upon the type of climate impact at issue, 
sensitivity is determined by such features as the quality of the 
housing stock, underlying health conditions, land elevation, and 
proximity to other hazards. The capacity to cope is a function 
of such factors as a community’s financial and social resources, 
access to health care, and geographic mobility.
Both physical and social factors thus determine climate 
impacts.34 Social scientists evaluate social factors in terms of 
social vulnerability, defined as “the characteristics of a person or 
group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, 
and recover from the impact of a natural hazard.”35 Substantial 
evidence demonstrates that social vulnerability is greater for the 
poor, the elderly, racial minorities, people with underlying health 
conditions or disabilities, the socially isolated and politically 
marginalized, immigrants, and communities that are dependent 
upon vulnerable natural resources.36
To avoid these disparities, climate change adaptation 
policies must grapple with underlying socioeconomic inequities. 
Decreasing social vulnerability requires adaptation measures 
that both reduce the underlying sensitivity to harm and enhance 
impacted communities’ resilience to harm after it has occurred. 
As in the environmental justice context, pursuing climate justice 
involves improving substantive outcomes for disadvantaged 
communities, developing inclusive and empowering participa-
tory mechanisms, and addressing the deeper social and institu-
tional forces that create and perpetuate systemic disparities,37 
themes addressed by the seven principles articulated below.
Improving equity is valuable not only on its own terms, 
but because of the adverse societal consequences of failing to 
address equity. Widespread homelessness, unemployment, and 
illness disrupt the social fabric of a community and could cre-
ate far-reaching instability. The 
already-frayed social safety net 
may be unable to cope with the 
scale of disruption that could 
occur. Considered comprehen-
sively, it is more prudent to 
develop adaptation plans that 
avoid harm than it is to attempt to 
repair the harm after the fact — or 
suffer the consequences of irrepa-
rable devastation.38
seven prinCiples for 
equitable adaptation
Given the key role of socio-
economic factors in determining 
the magnitude of climate impacts, 
an integrated ecological, social, and economic approach to 
adaptation planning, like that suggested by Rob Verchick and 
by Manuel Pastor and his co-authors in the disaster planning 
context, is essential to equitable adaptation efforts.39 Although 
successful adaptation will require attention to a wide range of 
important principles,40 this article articulates a subset of that 
array, focusing on those principles with the greatest impact on 
equity.
The principles are intended to guide adaptation planning 
in any of the contexts in which it emerges. The principles are 
applicable to action taken by local, state, or national entities. 
They could inform new adaptation legislation, or they could be 
integrated into adaptation efforts by institutions, like disaster 
management agencies, housing agencies, public health orga-
nizations, and local governments as they act under existing 
authorities.
1. Government Has an Important role to play
A threshold question is whether government action is neces-
sary or whether people can (and should) take care of themselves. 
There is little dispute over the importance of governmental 
measures to protect key infrastructure, like highways and energy 
systems. Where individual or private business welfare is at 
stake, however, some might argue that as long as the government 
The principles are 
intended to guide 
adaptation planning in 
any of the contexts in 
which it emerges.
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provides accurate and accessible information about current and 
future climate impacts, the private market will generate the 
optimal response. As citizens perceive growing threats, they will 
respond, and their responses will reflect their individual (and dif-
fering) risk tolerances. For example, they will or will not move 
away from floodplains, seashores, or disease-prone areas, buy 
hazard insurance, trim fire-prone vegetation in their yards, and 
purchase air conditioning. Under this view, if citizens end up in 
harm’s way, then they are responsible for their own choices.41
Relying on individual initiative is, however, unlikely to lead 
to sufficient adaptation. Individuals could discount what appear 
to be inchoate, distant, and remote threats. As a consequence, 
they could fail to make sufficient investments to prepare for 
uncertain risks. Moreover, certain adaptation choices, like 
retreat, require difficult emotional decisions that could lead to 
collectively irrational results, as community residents prefer 
denial to leaving their homes and communities and losing all the 
social capital that resides in existing community structures.
Relying on the market is particularly detrimental to low-
income marginalized communities. As Manuel Pastor and 
his co-authors have observed, relying on “market forces” to 
adequately prepare for disasters and other climate change 
impacts will fail to provide an adequate adaptation response 
because reliance on private action fails to protect those without 
the knowledge or means to act, systematically disadvantaging 
poor and isolated communities.42 Even assuming adequate 
knowledge, poor residents do not have the resources to respond 
to that knowledge by preparing, insuring, or moving.43 When 
serious disasters occur, the government has historically provided 
some compensation, but that compensation cannot make up for 
underlying inequities.44
Moreover, relying on market forces to depopulate at-risk 
areas would exacerbate, not reduce, risks to low-income and of-
color citizens who could be powerfully attracted to newly afford-
able housing – housing that has become affordable and available 
because it is at risk.45 Where citizens do not have adequate 
resources and face limited housing mobility due to lingering 
discrimination, individual responses to climate change risk do 
not reflect free and unconstrained “choices.”
Given the likelihood that market forces will fail to ade-
quately protect people from harm, and fail in ways that exac-
erbate risks for more vulnerable populations, comprehensive 
government adaptation initiatives are warranted. The remainder 
of this section addresses key themes to guide the incorporation 
of equity considerations in adaptation policy.
2. Design substantive aDaptation Measures that 
aDDress vulnerability
Adaptation policies that attempt to treat everyone the same, 
regardless of underlying demographic characteristics, will result 
in substantial inequality given underlying differences. To achieve 
equitable adaptation, adaptation policies must explicitly address 
the demographics of affected populations and target interven-
tions to address the needs of the most vulnerable.46 Although 
such measures cannot eliminate all inequity – they cannot 
prevent the inexorable loss of Native American Alaskan coastal 
communities, for example – they could in many instances reduce 
harm and lessen disparities. Relevant characteristics include 
income, race, age, status as renters versus owners, and type of 
employment. Immigrant status is also relevant to adaptation 
policy, and is addressed explicitly below in connection with 
communication measures.
Disparities in income create many of the most significant 
disparities in vulnerability to climate change impacts. Income 
disparities also have a racial dimension: Although many whites 
live in poverty, communities of color are disproportionately 
poor.47 Climate impacts that disproportionately impact the poor 
will therefore affect a larger percentage of people of color. 
Adaptation policies that target resources toward low-income 
communities could thus ameliorate both income and racial 
disparities.
For example, given poor families’ lack of resources to 
prepare for disasters,48 funding hazard preparation measures 
for low-income households or assisting with housing retrofits 
to provide cooling could improve outcomes for disadvantaged 
communities.49 Moreover, poor residents are less likely to have 
adequate transportation to flee disasters,50 face greater chal-
lenges in finding affordable and safe shelter if evacuation is 
necessary,51 and are less likely to have air conditioning or other 
means for keeping cool in heat waves.52 As Hurricane Katrina 
made abundantly clear, adaptation plans must provide timely 
transportation options,53 provide for adequate and safe public 
shelters, and provide cooling centers in heat waves so that poor 
residents do not remain in place – and at risk – because of inad-
equate transportation or fear of public facilities.
In the disaster recovery context, to avoid homelessness and 
widespread suffering, low-income residents will require various 
forms of assistance, including adequate housing vouchers and 
relocation assistance where rebuilding is infeasible. If rebuilding 
requirements, like flood-proofing codes, add significant costs 
to re-building, then government support for such measure may 
be needed to ensure that low-income households are not priced 
out of rebuilding.54 Given the challenges in siting and building 
low-income and public housing, a strong governmental role, 
and financial support, is likely to be necessary to ensure that 
adequate low-income options are available.
Long-range land use planning to address shifts in habit-
ability will have important equity implications and should avoid 
criteria that adversely impact low-income communities. For 
example, if planners in an area subject to flooding risks were 
to choose what areas to protect based solely upon land value, 
that criterion would systematically undermine poor communi-
ties, communities that often have less power in local land use 
debates.55 Land use decisions about protection, retreat, and new 
development should be guided by substantive criteria that recog-
nize a range of community values, including but not limited to 
land value. In addition, decisions about how to facilitate retreat, 
and how to compensate for the loss of property, should recognize 
that low-income residents do not have the resources to start fresh 
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elsewhere and face significant risks of homelessness or deepen-
ing poverty if relocation assistance is not provided.
Such long-range land use planning must also address poten-
tial impacts on areas that are likely to experience in-migration, 
as the population shifts from areas at risk to areas that face 
fewer risks and remain more habitable.56 Adequate affordable 
housing in the nation’s more habitable regions will be essential 
to avoid serious housing shortages and potential increases in 
homelessness.
Income is not the only demographic feature requiring 
sustained attention in the development of adaptation measures. 
Elderly and disabled residents face substantially greater risks 
in disasters because they are less likely to have adequate inde-
pendent transportation, fare worse in shelters without adequate 
medical services, and are likely to suffer greater psychological 
distress from a disaster’s profound disruptions.57 They are also 
more vulnerable to public health threats, like heat and disease.58 
As a consequence, special accommodations for transportation, 
shelter, and medical needs are necessary for elderly and disabled 
residents to avoid serious consequences from disasters and the 
range of public health threats that climate change could cause.59
Renters also require particularized attention. Renters are 
less able to prepare for disasters or heat waves because landlords 
control investments in home strengthening, air conditioning, or 
other mechanisms to reduce vulnerability to disasters or heat 
waves.60 Local governments could adopt building codes that 
require or incentivize landlords to strengthen structures and 
install air conditioning. Moreover, in hot climates, building 
codes could require building designs that minimize summer heat 
and incorporate energy-efficient cooling mechanisms. Given 
evidence that past disaster recovery programs have provided 
more resources for homeowners than for displaced renters,61 
adaptation planners should ensure that recovery programs pro-
vide adequate options for renters, including vouchers and hous-
ing alternatives.62 In developing post-disaster rebuilding plans, 
relevant officials should include sufficient replacement rental 
and public housing, housing that has historically been replaced 
at a lower rate than other forms of housing.63
Lastly, given variations in risk exposure by occupation, 
adaptation planning should address the unique needs of certain 
workers. Outdoor workers, like agricultural, construction, and 
sanitation workers, face greater risks from high heat and pol-
lution levels.64 Those risks could be reduced by adjustments to 
the workday and by occupational safety guidelines that address 
adequate hydration, cessation of work when ambient tempera-
tures exceed a certain level, and other measures to protect vul-
nerable workers.
3. Provide Culturally-SenSitive CommuniCationS 
and ServiCeS
Communication is key to effective adaptation. Given the 
diversity of populations, community and demographic-specific 
strategies are necessary.65 Public education can help communi-
ties prepare for disasters and inform them about how to address 
public health risks from heat waves, allergens, or new diseases. 
Early warning systems are also essential to prepare for weather-
related disasters, including potential flooding and heat waves.66 
Effective disaster response requires providing those affected 
with information about evacuation and shelter options. After 
a disaster occurs, effective recovery depends upon widespread 
access to information about available recovery resources.
Experience in the disaster context demonstrates that lin-
guistic and cultural isolation will exacerbate climate impacts 
for immigrant communities unless proactive steps are taken to 
develop community-specific communication mechanisms.67 
In addition to identifying language needs, adaptation planners 
need to identify culturally appropriate modes of communication 
including, potentially, newspapers, radio, television, e-mail, 
social media, or door-to-door outreach.68 Given undocumented 
immigrants’ justifiable fear of deportation or historically rooted 
distrust of government,69 government agencies should provide 
assurances that they will not deport.70 In addition, agencies could 
partner with nongovernmental community organizations that 
could facilitate community outreach, provide information, and 
help organize vulnerable or impacted communities.71 The same 
issues arise in the context of providing services, like shelters or 
cooling centers, and in the context of distributing resources, like 
disaster relief.
Effective communications strategies are likely to vary for 
non-immigrant as well as immigrant communities, and require 
location-specific assessments.72 Some neighborhoods may have 
strained relationships with local police departments or other 
officials.73 Certain populations could also require different 
communication methods. For example, personal, door-to-door 
warning and assistance may be necessary to adequately prepare 
elderly and disabled residents.74
4. develoP PartiCiPatory ProCeSSeS
Decisionmakers cannot develop substantively appropri-
ate adaptation and communication strategies without the right 
participatory processes. Given the importance of community-
specific information, adaptation planning processes require 
bottom-up participatory mechanisms.75 Such participatory pro-
cesses are important not only to obtain critical information, but 
to provide marginalized communities with a voice in difficult 
political decisions.76 Consistent with principles of environmen-
tal justice, adaptation planning could provide a vehicle for com-
munity empowerment and self-determination.77
Adaptation planners should engage with community leaders 
to obtain site-specific information about relative disaster or heat 
preparedness and to identify appropriate modes of – and insti-
tutions for – communicating information about preparedness, 
warnings, and recovery.78 Community-based information about 
available resources is also essential, including transportation and 
shelter options in the event of natural disasters or heat waves.79
The political dimension to participatory processes is as 
important as the informational dimension. Many adaptation-
related decisions will be politically controversial. For example, 
planners must determine who benefits from disaster recovery 
resources. What resources for homeowners? What resources for 
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renters? If new housing will be built, what income levels will 
it serve? With what neighborhood structures? In the long-term, 
communities facing flood and fire risks will have to make fateful 
decisions about what areas to protect and what areas to abandon.
To be effective, participatory opportunities need to occur 
early in the process and address local power dynamics. Timing 
is critical to the ability to shape decision making; an obligatory 
public hearing on an already-complete planning document does 
not constitute real public participation. An extended process 
of place-based community hearings and forums is more likely 
to generate meaningful participation.80 Moreover, given power 
disparities and the political marginalization of some communi-
ties, carefully crafted and targeted outreach will be necessary to 
draw in all communities. While good participatory mechanisms 
cannot erase endemic power imbalances, they at least provide 
transparent forums that give historically less powerful constitu-
encies a seat at the table.
5. Reduce undeRlying non-climate enviRonmental 
StReSSeS
In some instances, climate change does not create new risks; 
it exacerbates existing risks. For example, it could increase risks 
from flooded sewage treatment plants, industry, or waste sites.81 
As Prof. Robin Craig has observed, a key adaptation principle 
is to “Eliminate or Reduce Non-climate Stresses and Otherwise 
Promote Resilience.”82 By improving the baseline, climate 
impacts will be less extreme. Because environmental justice 
research has demonstrated that many existing environmental 
problems, like hazardous waste storage and disposal sites, air 
pollution, and other environmental risks are disproportionately 
located in of-color and low-income communities,83 reducing 
non-climate environmental stressors will have indirect equity 
benefits.
For example, improving inadequate storm water manage-
ment, an existing non-climate problem, could mitigate the 
contamination that could arise from climate-caused increases 
in extreme precipitation.84 In their compliance and enforce-
ment initiatives, EPA or applicable state agencies could include 
vulnerability to disasters as a key factor in prioritizing their 
review of industrial and municipal storm water management 
plans and assessing compliance with industrial waste storage 
requirements. Similarly, the federal superfund program and its 
state equivalents could consider flood or fire risks in prioritiz-
ing cleanup efforts and in selecting remedies that take potential 
future disasters into account.85 Moreover, aggressive efforts to 
reduce air pollution now will reduce the adverse consequences 
of future heat-induced air pollution increases.86
Following this principle would not only mitigate climate 
impacts; it would provide significant co-benefits by reducing 
existing non-climate stresses. Given extensive co-benefits, such 
initiatives are often considered “no” or “low” regrets policies 
that are justified whether or not climate change occurs.87
6. mitigate mitigation: addReSSing adaptation/
mitigation tRadeoffS
Although climate adaptation (addressing the impacts of 
climate change) and climate mitigation (reducing GHG emis-
sions to lessen climate change) often involve different regulatory 
strategies, there are significant interactions between adaptation 
and mitigation measures. Policymakers need to consider the 
interplay between mitigation and adaptation.
In some instances, mitigation measures could be “maladap-
tive” by creating adaptation challenges, some of which raise 
equity concerns.88 For example, a key strategy for reducing 
GHG emissions is encouraging smart growth to reduce trans-
portation emissions from sprawl.89 That smart growth could, 
however, increase urban heat. Scientists have documented that 
dense urban environments increase urban temperatures by sev-
eral degrees over less-dense surrounding areas, a phenomena 
known as the “urban heat island effect.”90 Moreover, although 
having denser cities might reduce overall air pollution emissions 
by reducing the driving associated with sprawl, increased urban 
density could increase localized air pollution levels.91 Finally, 
because many existing urban areas are in coastal areas and 
along rivers that face high disaster risks,92 intensifying growth 
would often, as Prof. Lisa Grow Sun has suggested, constitute 
“smart growth in dumb places.”93 Where smart growth is jus-
tified, land use measures should prevent development in the 
riskiest areas and provide green spaces to minimize urban heat.94 
Transportation infrastructure should facilitate evacuation and be 
resilient to damage from potential disasters.95
Certain mitigation measures could also generate equity con-
cerns if they increase energy costs, which could occur through 
greater reliance on more expensive renewable energy or from 
imposing a price on carbon through a market-based mechanism 
like cap-and-trade or a carbon tax.96 Measures to alleviate such 
impacts, like financing energy efficiency or public transporta-
tion, would ameliorate the potential adverse economic conse-
quences of climate mitigation policies.
In other instances, adaptation measures could compromise 
mitigation. For example, while policymakers should develop 
cooling strategies to protect people from heat waves, policies 
that simply require or finance the installation of air conditioning 
would undermine mitigation by increasing energy demand.97 In 
addition to, or instead of air conditioning, policymakers should 
consider building standards that lead to cooler buildings,98 urban 
designs that reduce the heat island effect, cooling centers, and 
demand-response systems that allow residents or utilities to 
reduce air conditioning use in unoccupied buildings.
7. a compRehenSive agenda
While these suggestions for incorporating equity consider-
ations into adaptation planning are important, it is also clear that 
they address symptoms, not causes. Underlying socioeconomic 
vulnerabilities create the disparities in the capacity to recover and 
reconstruct from disasters, inequities in the capacity to relocate 
to avoid harm, and differences in the public health consequences 
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of increasing heat, pollution, and disease. We are confronting 
more than a “disaster planning” or “adaptation planning” issue.
A larger socioeconomic agenda is critical to achieving 
equitable adaptation. The IPCC has stated that “[a] prerequisite 
for sustainability in the context of climate change is addressing 
the underlying causes of vulnerability, including the structural 
inequalities that create and sustain poverty and constrain access 
to resources.”99 The IPCC states further that “[a]ddressing social 
welfare, quality of life, infrastructure, and livelihoods … in the 
short term … facilitates adaptation to climate extremes in the 
longer term.”100
Successful adaptation will require addressing such per-
vasive issues as poverty, affordable housing, the provision of 
healthcare, and the political voice of currently marginalized 
communities.101 Building social infrastructure has always been 
a laudable goal. Impending climate impacts provide yet another 
reason to mend social ills, or risk systemic disruptions that could 
make disasters like Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath the norm 
rather than the exception.
ConClusion
While global climate change is an “environmental” prob-
lem, the scope and scale of its impacts is strongly determined 
by underlying socioeconomic variables. As climate impacts 
emerge, they have the potential to exacerbate existing inequali-
ties and cause severe hardships for the nation’s most vulnerable 
populations – hardships that are not only intrinsically of con-
cern, but also destabilizing to the larger community. These seven 
principles provide policymakers with guideposts for achieving 
equitable adaptation.
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